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It will be an all too obvious truth to readers of this journal that the law on implied
trusts as it applies to the acquisition and quantification of interests in real property
has undergone a period of considerable change and uncertainty over the last decade,
and many questions and confusions remain. One principle had, however, seemed
to emerge relatively clearly from the dicta in Stack v Dowden,1 Laskar v Laskar2
and Jones v Kernott3: the starting presumptions identified by Lady Hale in Stack
applied to domestic cases, broadly stated, but the presumption of a resulting trust
was more appropriate where the purchase was for commercial purposes. If this
approach was ever correct, it is no longer the case following the decision of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council inMarr v Collie.4
Facts and first instance decision
Terry Marr and Bryant Collie were in an intimate relationship for around 15 years.
In the course of their relationship, several pieces of real property were purchased,5
all but one of which were conveyed into their joint names. Their joint home (South
Westridge) was conveyed into Mr Marr’s sole name, apparently to enhance his
claim to be entitled to permanent residency in the Bahamas. As for the 11
conveyances into their joint names, the evidence suggested that Mr Marr was
responsible for purchasing the properties andMr Collie for developing them, albeit
that Mr Collie did not uphold his end of the bargain in a manner that was
documented but, conversely, they shared the obligation to pay the mortgages on
the properties at various times. In relation to one such “joint names” purchase, of
“Harbour Island”, an email from Mr Marr to an administrative assistant at a bank
1 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17.
2 Laskar v Laskar [2008] EWCA Civ 347.
3 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53.
4Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17.
5 In addition, a truck, a boat and numerous artworks were purchased by Mr Marr. The judge had applied a resulting
trust to all of them so that they were owned beneficially by Mr Marr. The Court of Appeal purported to apply Stack
v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 to all of them, dismissing Mr Collie’s appeal on the paintings but finding that the truck
was beneficially owned jointly because it was in their joint names and finding that that Mr Collie had acquired a 30%
interest in the truck through the addition of navigation equipment. The Privy Council treated the truck and boat in
the same way as the investment properties when remitting.
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stated that the couple were “considering a joint purchase meaning [they] would
have a 50% interest”.6
After the relationship between the parties broke down, in 2009, MrMarr sought
a declaration that he was the sole beneficial owner of all the properties because he
had provided all of the relevant purchase money. Mr Collie countered that they
were tenants in common in equal shares. In the Supreme Court of the Bahamas,
Isaacs J found in favour of Mr Marr. The Stack v Dowden presumption of joint
beneficial ownership was considered inapplicable “where the primary purpose of
the property purchase had been as an investment, even if there was a personal
relationship between the parties”.7 Isaacs J held that Mr Collie had “fallen far
short” of rebutting the alternative presumption of resulting trust in relation to the
“investment” properties held in joint names and purchased by Mr Marr.8 He also
held that the result would have been the same even if the Stack presumption had
been applied. In relation to South Westridge, Isaacs J found insufficient evidence
of a common intention to justify an equitable interest for Mr Collie, so that all of
the properties “were held on resulting or constructive trust” forMrMarr’s exclusive
benefit.9
Court of Appeal decision
Mr Collie appealed to the Bahamas Court of Appeal.10 Allen P (with whom
Blackman and John JJA simply agreed) held that his contention that the properties
held in joint names were not “investment” properties was unsustainable because
both parties “clearly and repeatedly assert[ed]” that they were purchased as such.11
Content to cite Australian authorities,12 she also held that in cases of joint legal
ownership, the maxim “equity follows the law” is presumptively applicable. That
presumption was “displaced or rebutted” where the purchase money was unequally
provided, and replaced by a presumption of resulting trust in accordance with the
proportions of purchase money provided.13 In a “joint names” case, whether a
non-provider of purchasemoney had an equitable interest depended on the intention
of the purchaser at the time of the purchase, such that “the presumption of a
resulting trust will be negated by clear evidence that it was the intention of the
purchaser, at the time of the purchase, to share the beneficial interest in the
property”.14 In the instant case, the Court of Appeal considered that the judge had
not considered whether there was any such evidence of an intention on Mr Marr’s
part.
It was also held that the judge had wrongly determined that the burden was on
Mr Collie to show that a gift was intended, since:
“all of the authorities provided by [Mr Marr] say that the party who claims
the [beneficial] ownership is different from the legal ownership and claims
6Marr v Collie [2014] BSCA 99 at [16].
7Marr v Collie Supreme Court of the Bahamas unreported at [52] quotedMarr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 at [18].
8Marr v Collie Supreme Court of the Bahamas unreported at [57] quotedMarr v Collie [2014] BSCA 99 at [4].
9Marr v Collie Supreme Court of the Bahamas unreported quotedMarr v Collie [2014] BSCA 99 at [4].
10Marr v Collie [2014] BSCA 99.
11Marr v Collie [2014] BSCA 99 at [8].
12Calverley v Green [1984] HCA 81,Muschinski v Dodds [1985] HCA 78 and Buffrey v Buffrey 9 I.T.E.L.R. 455.
13Marr v Collie [2014] BSCA 99 at [13].
14Marr v Collie [2014] BSCA 99 at [14].
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to be entitled to more than a half interest where the [legal] ownership is joint,
must so prove.”15
The conveyances, the joint mortgages and the email about Halifax Island
constituted:
“cogent evidence, in the absence of any evidence to rebut it, which proves
on the balance of probabilities that [Mr] Marr intended [Mr] Collie to have
an equal share in the investment properties.”16
The presumption of resulting trust was therefore rebutted. The Court of Appeal
allowed the appeal and ordered a sale of those properties on the basis that the
parties were tenants in common in equal shares.
Stack v Dowden was not cited by the Court of Appeal until Allen P came to
consider South Westridge, the property conveyed into Mr Marr’s sole name and
used by the parties as their home.17 Having considered the evidence concerning
the intimacy of the parties’ relationship, she concluded that the “principles
governing resulting trusts are not applicable” to South Westridge.18 The onus was
on Mr Collie to show that he had any interest, and the Court of Appeal found “no
reason to disturb” the finding that he had failed because there was no reliable
evidence that he spent money developing it, or that there was any agreement
between the parties as to his responsibility for outgoings.19
Privy Council decision
MrMarr appealed to the Privy Council, with the panel consisting of Lord Neuberger
(who dissented as to the reasoning in Stack but decided Laskar), Lady Hale (who
gave the lead judgment in Stack and jointly did the same in Jones v Kernott), Lords
Kerr and Wilson (who dissented as to the reasoning in Jones) and Lord Sumption.
Lord Kerr gave the sole judgment.MrMarr contended that the email about Harbour
Island had featured in neither the Bahamas Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeal
hearing and was inadmissible because it had not appeared in the agreed bundle,
or in the alternative that the Bahamas Court of Appeal had attached too much
weight to it. In addition, he submitted that Isaacs J had been correct to apply the
“classic” resulting trust to the investment properties,20 and that the Court of Appeal
had wrongly interfered with his conclusions on the facts and the law.
Lord Kerr embarked on a detailed analysis of the case law. Mindful of Lord
Walker’s citation in Stack of theMuschinski v Dodds21 approach to cases where a
combined domestic and commercial partnership existed, he concluded that “it is
the Board’s view that to consign the reasoning in Stack to the purely domestic
settingwould bewrong”.22As for LadyHale’s enunciation of the Stack presumption,
Lord Kerr held that “there is no reason to doubt its possible applicability to property
purchased by a couple in an enterprise reflecting their joint commercial, as well
15Marr v Collie [2014] BSCA 99 at [15].
16Marr v Collie [2014] BSCA 99 at [19].
17Marr v Collie [2014] BSCA 99, at [29], citing Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17.
18Marr v Collie [2014] BSCA 99 at [29].
19Marr v Collie [2014] BSCA 99 at [35].
20Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 at [29].
21Muschinski v Dodds [1985] HCA 78, cited Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 at [32].
22Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 at [39].
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as their personal, commitment” and “it is clear that she did not intend that the
principle should be confined exclusively to the domestic setting”.23 The intention
of the parties is key, and that was not undermined by Laskar. Conversely, even
on Lord Neuberger’s dissenting analysis in Stackwith its preference for the resulting
trust:
“[w]here additional evidence is available in the form of testimony from the
parties themselves as to what their intentions were when the property was
acquired…this can rebut the presumption of resulting trust.”24
Lord Kerr addressed the issue of the conflict between the Stack and resulting
trust presumptions, noting that a “simplistic” solution might be to say that:
“if the property is purchased in joint names by parties in a domestic
relationship the presumption of joint beneficial ownership applies but if bought
in a wholly non-domestic situation it does not … [and] the resulting trust
presumption obtains.”25
Hewas nevertheless anxious that “save perhaps where there is no evidence from
which the parties’ intentions can be identified, the answer is not to be provided by
the triumph of one presumption over another”.26 He emphasised the importance
of context, determined on these facts by common intention or the lack thereof. He
held that:
“[i]f it is the unambiguous mutual wish of the parties, contributing in unequal
shares to the purchase of property, that the joint beneficial ownership should
reflect their joint legal ownership, then effect should be given to that wish.”
But:
“[i]f, on the other hand, that is not their wish, or if they have not formed any
intention as to beneficial ownership but had, for instance, accepted advice
that the property be acquired in joint names, without considering or being
aware of the possible consequences of that, the resulting trust solution may
provide the answer.”27
On the facts of the present case, each party was considered to be relying on the
central question of common intention but they disagreed on what it was. Both
lower courts were held to have engaged in insufficient analysis of that intention.
Isaacs J had not given a sufficient reason for saying that the result would have
been the same had the Stack approach been applied: that would have required:
“as a minimum, an examination of the reasons that Mr Marr continued to
agree that properties purchased in 2008 should be conveyed into his and Mr
Collie’s joint names when, on his account, the anticipated contributions from
Mr Collie had not materialised,”28
23Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 at [40].
24Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 at [46].
25Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 at [53].
26Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17at [54].
27Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17.
28Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 at [59].
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and of the contents of the email. The Court of Appeal, for its part, had failed to
consider the judge’s findings that Mr Marr did not intend equal beneficial shares
(in light of the fact that he found Mr Marr more credible than Mr Collie) and that
the decision to convey into joint names was on the basis that Mr Collie would
make an equal contribution to development. It had also erred by basing its decision
on an email on which Mr Marr and his counsel were never even given the
opportunity to comment.
The Board felt that it had no alternative but to remit the case for a proper
examination of the common intention of the parties in relation to the investment
properties. It also held that:
“in line with the decision in Muschinski, it is necessary that it be decided
whether account be taken of the contributions made by the parties to the
purchase of the various properties and assets whose beneficial interest is in
dispute.”29
That remission “did not include the South Westridge property”, the implication
being that its beneficial ownership was no longer in dispute.30 The Board therefore
did not appear to analyse the vexed question of the matters relevant to the
acquisition in a “sole name” case, as distinct from the quantification in a “joint
names” case, of an interest under a common intention constructive trust.31
The prominence given to Lord Neuberger’s approach
The weight given by the Board to Lord Neuberger’s approach in Stack is striking,
given its character as a dissenting judgment on the reasoning. The implication
seems to be that, even if he was incorrect to apply the resulting trust to the facts
of Stack itself, Lord Neuberger’s analysis of that trust was nevertheless accurate,
including on the point that:
“[w]here additional evidence is available in the form of testimony from the
parties themselves as to what their intentions were when the property was
acquired, … this can rebut the presumption of resulting trust.”32
Lord Kerr’s purpose was perhaps to demonstrate that whether the resulting trust
or the Stack approach applied, both were merely presumptions (however strong
on particular facts) that could be rebutted by evidence of what the parties actually
intended. It is noteworthy, however, that Isaacs J does not appear to have applied
Lord Neuberger’s tentative suggestion in Laskar that:
“a mortgage in joint names … for which [the parties] were jointly and
separately liable, in respect of a property which they jointly owned… should
be treated in effect as representing equal contributions … by each party to
the acquisition of the property,”33
29Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 at [60]. A sum of money had been awarded to Mr Collie by Isaacs J to represent
contributions to one property. The Court of Appeal had remitted so that contributions to the improvement of the
jointly owned property could be determined.
30Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17.
31 See, generally, B. Sloan, “Keeping up with the Jones case: Establishing Constructive Trusts in ‘Sole Legal
Owner’ Scenarios” (2015) 35 Legal Studies 226.
32Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 at [46].
33 Laskar v Laskar [2008] EWCA Civ 347.
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since he found that the properties were entirely owned byMrMarr, notwithstanding
the fact that Mr Collie was a party to joint mortgages and had made somemortgage
contributions.
Domestic v Commercial situations
In the aftermath of Stack, Laskar and other cases, Piska wrote that “the court must
shoe-horn the parties’ relationship [including the reasons for the property purchase]
into the domestic or commercial dichotomy that determines the appropriate legal
principles”.34 The dichotomy appeared to be strengthened by the assertion in Jones
that:
“[t]he time has come to make it clear … that in the case of the purchase of a
house or flat in joint names for joint occupation by a married or unmarried
couple, where both are responsible for any mortgage, there is no presumption
of a resulting trust,”35
albeit that Lady Hale and Lord Walker later said that such a presumption would
merely be “rare in a domestic context”.36
This dichotomous approach had its difficulties because of the ambiguities
surrounding when precisely a case might be considered “domestic”.37 Piska
considered it problematic precisely because the same factors are being evaluated
in asking whether the case is a domestic one and whether there is a common
intention sufficient to found the existence of a constructive trust, and Yip and Lee
have recently queried the desirability of a “commercialisation” of trusts law more
generally.38 The courts, moreover, have on occasion had to grapple with difficult
categorisations. Recently, for example, the resulting trust has been applied to a
buy-to-let property purchased by a married couple in joint names,39 and to a dispute
over a residential property between a step-mother and step-daughter who were not
close.40
But Sloan did at least write that “Laskar does attach significance to the
categorisation of a case”,41 and now the assertion that Laskar “is authority for the
proposition that the principle in Stack v Dowden… applies only in ‘the domestic
consumer context’” has been specifically rejected without casting doubt on the
correctness of the decision.42 While the need to deal with “mixed” cases was
recognised in Stack itself,43 the appropriate presumption could previously seem
relatively clear once a case had been categorised using Laskar’s “primary purpose”
34N. Piska, “Two Recent Reflections on the Resulting Trust” [2008] Conv. 441, 446.
35 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 at [25], emphasis added.
36 Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 at [31].
37 See, e.g. B. Sloan, “Proprietary Estoppel: Recent Developments in England and Wales” (2010) 22 Singapore
Academy of L.J. 110; N. Hopkins, “The Relevance of Context in Property law: A Case for Judicial Restraint?” (2011)
31 Legal Studies 175; A. Hayward, “Finding a Home for ‘Family Property’” in N. Gravells (ed), Landmark Cases
in Land Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), Ch.10.
38M. Yip and J. Lee, “The Commercialisation of Equity” Legal Studies, forthcoming at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111
/lest.12167 [Accessed 7 July 2017].
39Erlam v Rahman [2016] EWHC 111 (Ch).
40Wodzicki v Wodzicki [2017] EWCA Civ 95. cf. Adekunle v Ritchie [2007] B.P.I.R. 1177, where the Stack
presumption was applied to a mother and son who lived together.
41B. Sloan, “Proprietary Estoppel: Recent Developments in England and Wales” (2010) 22 Singapore Academy
of L.J. 110, [44].
42Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 at [49].
43 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 at [32].
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test,44 even if the clarity was not always evident.45 Somewhat similarly to Isaac J’s
approach, the English High Court specifically held in Erlam v Rahman that “[t]here
is no reason to apply the special approach to the acquisition of homes to an
acquisition of property as a business proposition”.46 The impact of the Privy
Council’s decision in Marr v Collie, however, appears to be that even the
categorisation of a case as “commercial/investment” will not necessarily preclude
the operation of the Stack presumption. As we seek to demonstrate in the next
sub-section, the converse may also be true and such an approach based on
categorisation has been branded “simplistic”.47
The future role of Stack and the effect on litigation
A difficulty with the suggestion that whether the starting point (of Stack or the
resulting trust) itself depends on the common intention of the parties after
categorisation is that, as Thompson and George have pointed out:
“[i]t is integral to [purchase money resulting trust] cases … that it is
unnecessary, in order for a resulting trust to arise, to have regard to the actual
intention of the parties in order for the contributor to acquire an interest in
the property under a resulting trust.”48
While it is true that some basic reference to the parties’ intentions in relation to
the property is necessary in order to decide whether the case is domestic or
commercial, their purpose in buying it can be distinguished from their intended
ownership, and the factual inquiry for the former is likely to be more
straightforward, broader brush and less realistically the subject of a dispute. For
the latter, the essential problem is that while both the resulting trust and the Stack
presumption could be rebutted by evidence of some contrary common intention
about their ownership, their very purpose is to provide a starting point where such
evidence might be insufficiently clear. If both presumptions depend on an analysis
of the parties’ common intention before they arise in the first place, even after a
case has been categorised, that function is lost.49 That leads to a logical flaw in the
interaction between the two types of trust, as the presumption of a resulting trust
can be displaced by the existence of an agreement which gives rise to a constructive
trust.50 How can that displacement happen if the presumption of a resulting trust
is not applied by default to any purchase in joint names where they have contributed
unequally to the purchase price, prior to adducing evidence regarding the parties’
intentions?
This additional layer of investigation into the parties’ intentions prior to the
application of either presumption prompts wider reflection about the impact of the
current line of authorities on common intention constructive trusts. It should be
44 Laskar v Laskar [2008] EWCA Civ 347 at [17].
45 See, e.g. Geary v Rankine [2012] EWCA Civ 555.
46Erlam v Rahman [2016] EWHC 111 (Ch) at [41].
47Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 at [53].
48M. P. Thompson and M. George, Thompson’s Modern Land Law, 6th edn (Oxford: OUP 2017), p.305.
49B. Sloan, “Burdens, Presumptions and Confusion in the Law of Want of Knowledge and Approval” University
of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No.26/2017 at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2977319 [Accessed 7 July 2017] has recently pointed out a similar difficulty with inconsistent presumptions and
whether presumptions arise or are rebutted in the context of want of knowledge and approval of wills.
50 See, e.g. Agarwala v Agarwala [2013] EWCA Civ 1763; [2014] 2 F.L.R. 1069.
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remembered that the entire rationale for the alleged strength of the starting
presumption in domestic cases (that equity follows the law) was, according to
Lady Hale in Stack, because “strong feelings are aroused when couples split up”,
which leads “people to spend far more on the legal battle than is warranted by the
sums actually at stake”.51 The idea, according to the Privy Council inMarr v Collie,
that one should identify whether the parties have a “mutual wish” before the
presumptive starting point can be identified, flies in the face of the desire to make
the law as clear and predictable as possible. The people in relationships which
break down will normally have different views about what their intention was or
is—indeed, that is the normally the reason for the dispute about ownership—and
clear categories of presumption allow pragmatic advice to be given to clients in
the hope of avoiding the financial and emotional cost of a court case.
It is also difficult to see how this contextual approach laid out inMarr v Collie
might work in practice. Suppose that evidence is adduced that A and B did not
wish their joint legal ownership of the property to be reflected as joint beneficial
ownership. According to Lord Kerr, a resulting trust solution may provide the
answer in these cases,52 but that could also constitute one of the factors to rebut
the presumption of joint beneficial ownership under a constructive trust.53 That
wish, in other words, does not of itself tell a court which trust path to take in the
absence of a prior presumption about which framework is more appropriate to
apply to the dispute between A and B.
The weight of Privy Council decisions
The potential effect of Marr v Collie on the law is clearly significant, but one
complicating factor is that it has been handed down by the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council, rather than the UK Supreme Court. The Privy Council is the
final appellate court for a number of Commonwealth countries, as well as the 14
British Overseas territories, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man. The status
of Privy Council decisions in English law’s system of precedent was recently
clarified by the Supreme Court inWillers v Joyce (No.2),54 and several points bear
repetition in the present context. First, while a court in England and Wales should
find a Privy Council decision of “great weight and persuasive value”, it is clearly
not binding on an English court as a matter of precedent.55 Secondly, an English
court should never follow a decision of the Privy Council if it is inconsistent with
a decision that would be binding under the normal system of precedent. Thirdly,
and by exception, where the Privy Council decides that an earlier decision of the
House of Lords or Supreme Court, or Court of Appeal, is wrong, they can expressly
direct that the earlier decision is incorrect and the Privy Council decision should
be treated as representing the law of England and Wales.56 There is also the
possibility that the Privy Council was merely providing “guidance” about the
51 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 at [68].
52Marr v Collie [2017] UKPC 17 at [54].
53As per Lady Hale’s non-exhaustive factors listed in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 at [69].
54Willers v Joyce (No.2) [2016] UKSC 44.
55Willers v Joyce (No.2) [2016] UKSC 44 at [12].
56Willers v Joyce (No.2) [2016] UKSC 44 at [21].
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proper interpretation of the English authorities, particularly given the panel
membership.57
There was no express indication in Marr v Collie that any otherwise binding
decision should be seen as wrong, nor that the decision should be taken to represent
English law. That omission must be because of Lord Kerr’s assertion that the
House of Lords in Stack had never meant to confine the presumption to domestic
cases alone, and equally it had not been Lord Neuberger’s intent to carve out
commercial purchases as the sole province of resulting trusts in Laskar. This is a
delicate argument, to say the least, because it disregards the near universal view
on the composite reasoning of those cases, as well as Jones v Kernott.58 The
suspicionmight be that this approach was taken precisely so that the Privy Council
were not faced with the prospect of declaring an English court decision incorrect.
Not only that, there is also a possible conflict with the Court of Appeal’s decision
in Wodzicki v Wodzicki, where the Stack presumption was not applied because
‘there was nothing close about the relationship’ between the appellant and
respondent.59 The Court of Appeal’s reasoning had nothing to do with any
ascertainment of the intention that the parties had, but rather the dynamic or strength
of their relationship. The High Court decision in Erlam v Rahmanmore obviously
conflicts with the decision inMarr v Collie; it applies that “simplistic” dichotomy
of resulting trusts applying in commercial cases, as it understood Laskar to be
authority for. What should a Circuit Judge, faced with a dispute of this kind, now
do: apply the doctrine of precedent strictly and follow the English line of authorities
from Laskar to Erlam, or bow to the weight of the Privy Council decision inMarr
v Collie?
Conclusion
Presumptions about how the division of property is regulated and calculated when
relationships, whether commercial or domestic in origin, break down are important.
At their core, they reduce the potential scope, and indeed threat, of litigation; in
Lord Hope’s words in Stack, “[t]he advantage of this approach [of joint beneficial
ownership] is that everyone will know where they stand with regard to the
property”.60 This is true even if the reported cases suggest that it is relatively easy
to rebut the Stack presumption, as both Stack and Jones themselves demonstrate.61
The commercial/domestic dichotomy had theoretical weaknesses, but there was a
great deal of practical sense to it. Commercial partners usually do not expect
survivorship with its “tontine ‘winner takes all’ effect”62 to be applied to their
relationships, which is at odds with a presumption of joint beneficial ownership.
Instead, they want out what they put in, and the admittedly simplistic but
57Abou-Rahmah v Abacha [2006] EWCA Civ 1492 at [68] per Arden LJ.
58See, e.g. B. McFarlane, N. Hopkins and S. Nield, Land Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 3rd edn (Oxford: OUP,
2015), pp.371–372, pp.553–554; P. S. Davies and G. Virgo, Equity & Trusts: Text, Cases and Materials, 2nd edn
(Oxford: OUP, 2016), p.455; M. Dixon,Modern Land Law, 10th edn (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), pp.174–175; M.
P. Thompson and M. George, Thompson’s Modern Land Law, 6th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2017), pp.300–302.
59Wodzicki v Wodzicki [2017] EWCACiv 95 at [25] per David Richards LJ. Confusingly, the judge at first instance
had identified the intentions of the claimant and defendant before deciding that they owned the property according
to their contributions under a resulting trust.
60 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 at [5].
61 cf. e.g. Fowler v Barron [2008] EWCA Civ 377.
62 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 at [57] per Lady Hale, applyingMalayan Credit Ltd v Jack Chia-MPH Ltd
[1986] A.C. 549.
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unquestionably efficient presumption of a resulting trust achieves precisely that.
Cohabiting couples, in contrast, have a much more complex attachment to their
property and to each other, and the presumption of joint ownership together with
the non-exhaustive factors listed in Stack to rebut that presumption provides a
nuanced and discretionary (if sometimes difficult) approach.
The decision of the Privy Council inMarr v Collie is to be regretted because it
takes the law one step back; commercial partners could now find themselves tied
up in litigation over what they had intended or not intended because one party is
encouraged to chance their arm, in the hope they could take a higher proportion
of the equity under the Stack framework,63 and cohabiting couples could equally
be faced with a submission that the presumption of joint beneficial ownership
should not be used at all. Ultimately, while the application of two presumptions
in two different circumstances may indeed be “simplistic” and cannot be entirely
divorced from common intention, it is also conceptually simple and efficient, and
the loss of those presumptions renders the law of implied trusts as it applies to the
purchase of real property even more needlessly complex and uncertain.
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A Proprietary Right to Recreate
Regency Villas Title Ltd v Diamond Resorts (Europe) Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 238
Easements; Sports and leisure facilities; Validity
Introduction
Regency Villas Title Ltd v Diamond Resorts (Europe) Ltd1 (Regency Villas)
presented the Court of Appeal with the first opportunity since Re Ellenborough
Park2 to consider the issue of whether an easement can exist for the use of
recreational facilities. In a single judgment delivered by Vos LJ it was held that,
in principle, there could be a valid easement to use recreational facilities, provided
that the right gives a utility or benefit to the dominant tenement. Accordingly, a
number of the rights claimed by the claimants (who were the respondents in the
appeal) did amount to a valid easement, although some others did not.
63Lord Neuberger described the approach in Stack as “invitation to an expensive and time consuming exercise at
all stages—disclosure, witness statements and court hearing”. See “The Conspirators, The Tax Man, The Bill of
Rights and a Bit About the Lovers”, Chancery Bar Association Annual Lecture, 10 March 2008 at [18].
*Associate Professor of Property Law, University of Leicester. The authors would like to thank Alastair Hudson,
John Mee and Sean Thomas for their helpful discussions about the case, and particularly James Lee, Jo Miles and
the anonymous referee for their comments on a draft of this note. All views and any errors remain those of the authors.
** Fellow in Law, Robinson College, Cambridge.
1Regency Villas Title Ltd v Diamond Resorts (Europe) Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 238.
2Re Ellenborough Park [1956] Ch. 131.
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